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A question of causality between political corruption, economic 
freedom and economic growth in Europe 
 Ayhan Kuloglu  Oana-Ramona Lobont  Mert Topcu 
Economic, cultural, social, psychological, political, administrative and religious effects of 
corruption are manifested by functional, political and moral degradation of local public 
authorities, which is a result of the expansion of political corruption, by reducing the 
transparent and accountable political power or by social tensions and increasing 
impoverishment of the population. 
In the executive activity, corruption has an effect on the reduced quality of public 
administration, the existence of an informal decision-making system and close links between 
organized crime, corrupt officials and politicians. Thus, outwardly effects of corruption, even in 
international relations, is manifested by the conduct of incompetent, irresponsible, provocative 
and subjective – conventional behavior of persons in positions of responsibility which, in 
dealing with foreign partners, primarily promotes personal and corporate interests against 
national interests, which, inevitably undermines the country's image and credibility as a partner 
in international relations. 
This paper tries to showa more accurate picture of the extent of corruption in Europe, through 
individual analysis of indicators measuring corruption and by quantifying the relation between 
corruption and political, administrative and economic determinants factors, through a 
regressive “pool data” model. For a fine approximation of the decision-making mechanism, in 
accordance with the policies they generate, there is a necessity the knowledge and 
understanding of how the political elements are transformed into real elements to measure their 
incidence. This paper adds to the empirical literature on the relationship between corruption 
and economic growth by incorporating the impact of economic freedom. 
Keywords: Political corruption, economic freedom, economic growth 
1. Introduction 
It is not necessary to be adept of alarmist or panicard ideas to see that a threat, under various forms of 
manifestation, over the time, was always present in developing relations between people, that has 
perfected the specific methods of action, standing the myriad causes of conflict situations that have 
shadowed the evolution of human society, both socially and economically. 
The complex and difficult process, sometimes contradictory, of transformation and radical 
restructuring that involves the transition from one political system to another, from a hypercentralized 
economy to a market economy, has on its content, intense phenomena of inherent social 
disorganization in a new form of organization. 
Therefore, the causes of individual and socialcorruption must be seen in close interdependence and 
reported with the profound change processes that characterize society as a whole. 
Socio-political effects of corruption is manifested by functional, political and moral degradation of 
local public authorities, which is a result of the expansion of political corruption, by reducing the 
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transparent and accountable political power or by social tensions and increasing impoverishment of 
the population.  
The debate on the impact of corruption on economic performance goes beyond a “moralistic view” 
that unequivocally condemns corruption, that is way this research tries to link the corruption, 
economic freedom and economic growth and investigate whether they exists any causal relations. 
In this paper, the linkage between political corruption, economic freedom and economic growth were 
examined in empirical context for European Union, over 1995-2010, in both directions: corruption 
causes economic growth or economic freedom or vice-versa, economic freedom or political freedom 
serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater 
political freedom yield a lower “corrupt” society?  
This paper adds to the empirical literature on the relationship between corruption and economic 
growth by incorporating the economic freedom and the extend approach of corruption in two 
theoretical points, in a more general political economy of public policy: 1) the proxy for political 
corruption and bureaucratic corruption and 2) a dimension of good governance. 
Following the introductory part, related literature was overviewed in the second part and the 
methodology of the study and econometric model were put forth in the third part and finally the 
findings were interpreted and a general review was made. 
2. Literature review 
The determinants of corruption, in line with the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, are diverse 
and heterogeneous and the relevant literature has addressed a large number of these determinants and 
come up with different results. That is way the aim of this paper is to review and extend the empirical 
evidence on the relationship between corruption, economic freedom and economic growth, by 
responding to these questions: 1) corruption causes economic growth or vice-versa; 2) economic 
growth causes economic freedom or vice-versa; 3) economic freedom causes corruption or vice-versa?  
Under forms, effects and the controversial issues arising from corruption phenomena, we consider 
necessary to clarify the conditions that allow its expression. Thus, we can better understand the 
meanings and implications of corruption on socio-economic performance. 
2.1. Review from definition to methods of measurement 
In an attempt to identify the degree to which corruption and economic freedom correlates with the 
development indicators, as these are reflected in statistics and reports prepared by various 
organizations, we consider useful the description of how the indicators are designed. 
Also, such an approach is necessary, in order to understand which indicators are a prerequisite for 
development and which indicators reflect the state of development, in terms of items that can appear as 
contradictory. 
In this respect, considering the controversies in the field, with their openings and their limits, we can 
identify a number of definitions and of indicators that shape the notions of corruption, economic 
freedom and growth. 
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Corruption is a problem that mainly arises in the interaction between government and the market 
economy where the government itself must be considered endogenous (Andvig et al., 2000). The 
approach of corruption occurs basically in this main forms: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, 
cronyism, nepotism, patronage and graft, but there is no international consensus on the meaning of 
corruption (Rohwer, 2009): 
- Bribery is understood as the payment (in money or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt 
relationship. Equivalent terms to bribery include, for example, kickbacks, commercial 
arrangements or pay-offs. These are all notions of corruption in terms of the money or favours 
paid to employees in private enterprises, public officials and politicians. They are payments or 
returns needed or demanded to make things pass more swiftly, smoothly or more favourably 
through state or government bureaucracies. 
- Embezzlement is theft of resources by people who are responsible for administering them, 
e.g., when disloyal employees steal from their employers. It is not considered corruption from 
a strictly legal point of view, but is included in a broader definition. 
- Fraud is an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit. It in-volves 
manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by public officials for their own 
profit. 
- Extortion is money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats to 
use force. 
- Cronyism is a form of corruption in which political officials and businessmen show preference 
to friends when appointing people to positions of power, awarding contacts, and delegating 
tasks related to their office. 
- Nepotism or favouritism is the natural human proclivity to favour friends, family (wife, 
brothers and sisters, children, nephews, cousins, in-laws etc.) and anybody close and trusted. 
Favouritism is closely related to corruption insofar as it implies a corrupted (undemocratic, 
“privatised”) distribution of resources. 
- Patronage as corruption phenomenon is the illegal conduct which gives an individual or group 
some private advantage which is contrary to the public interest. Corruption may become part 
of patronage, for example, if it is legally required that government contracts go to the lowest 
bidder, yet a client uses influence to win a contract even though his or her bid is higher than 
others. 
- Graft is defined as a use of public stature to gain illegal benefit. Technically, corruption covers 
an entire host of abuses, of which graft is one. Graft and corruption are charges that are 
typically leveled at highly-placed government officials, who are able to use public funds to 
improve their own fortunes due to increased access, influence, knowledge or power that comes 
with an elevated position. 
This approach explains the evolution of corruption in terms of society evolution and in terms of values 
that characterize different stages of its development, from traditional to modern society and 
postmodern. The causes and reasons for corrupt behavior are considered, therefore, rooted mainly in 
socio-cultural contexts persistent over time. These seven categories capture most of the types of 
corruption described in the literature. There may, however, be certain acts that correspond to people’s 
intuitions of corruption and do not fit neatly into one of these categories. 
Systemic corruption has important implications in terms of assessment and program design. It 
encompasses the notions of both grand corruption (involving members of the political and economic 
elite) and administrative corruption (which involves the interactions of mid- and lower-level officials 
with small and medium-size businesses and ordinary citizens) (Lanyi and Azfar, 2005). 
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These different approaches to corruption, as social, political and economic phenomenon, cause a 
number of difficulties in transposition in the indicators for measuring. Corruption indicators differ in 
conceptual breadth, some have more dimensions than others, so, most of them provide a single 
measure of corruption intended to reflect a mix of various aspects of corruption. 
Regardless of one’s preferred conceptual definition, the choice of measurement techniques from a 
limited set of feasible alternatives inevitably produces an implicit definition that can differ 
substantially from one’s ideal. Any pair of assessment methodologies will measure a different (if 
unknown) mix of these various dimensions of corruption.  
In recent years, corruption measures, at the regional, national and global level, mostly using perception 
surveys as the leading method to collect data, trend to group around two types: 
 measures of the existence and quality of institutions, rules and procedures as governance and 
anticorruption inputs; 
 measures of what those mechanisms lead to in practice as governance and anticorruption 
outputs. 
Indicators have proved very useful in raising awareness, making cross-country comparisons and 
conducting statistical analysis, helping establish correlations between corruption and a wide range of 
variables (U4 – Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 2009). 
We can distinguish between the following types of corruption indicators (UNDP, 2008): 
 Perception-based indicators and experience-based indicators - are based on the opinions and 
perceptions of corruption in a given country among citizens and experts; 
 Indicators based on a single data source and composite indicators - are produced by the 
publishing organisation without recourse to third-party data whereas composite indicators 
aggragate and synthesize different measures generated by various third-party data sources 
 Proxy indicators - measure corruption indirect, by aggregating as many opinions (or voices) 
and signals of corruption, or by measuring the opposite: anti-corruption, good governance and 
public a countability mechanisms 
Table 1: provides an overview of posible international corruption indices 
Source Indicator name Website link Conceptual dimension 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
http://www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surve
ys_indices/cpi 
Perceptions of extent of petty 
corruption. Bribery 
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
http://www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surve
ys_indices/gcb 
Perceptions; Experience with 
corruption; Bribery 
Bribe Payers Index http://www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surve
ys_indices/bpi 
Original, Bribery 
Bertelsman 
Transformatio
n Index 
Bertelsman 
Transformation 
Index 
http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-
index.de/bti/ 
Proxy 
European 
Bank and 
World Bank 
Business 
environment and 
enterprise 
performance survey 
http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/BEEPS 
Original proxy, corruption in the 
business sector, pettty 
corruption, business regulations 
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Source Indicator name Website link Conceptual dimension 
World Bank, 
European 
Commission, 
DFID 
Public Expenditures 
and Financial 
Accountability 
http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/P
EFA/0,,menuPK:7313471
~pagePK:7313134~piPK:
7313172~theSitePK:7327
438,00.html 
Assesses budget performance, 
trasparency of budget formation 
process, audit reports and other 
budget related practices 
World Bank 
Country policy and 
institutional 
assesment 
http://go.worldbank.org/7
NMQ1P0W10 
Proxy. Corruption in financial, 
trade and public sectors. degree 
of regulations. Quality of fiscal 
management 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.asp 
Hybrid 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 
http://gcr.weforum.org/gc
r2011/ 
Proxy 
Global 
Barometer 
Consortium 
Regional Barometers 
in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Europe 
www.afrobarometer.org 
www.asianbarometer.org 
www.latinobarometro.org 
ec.europa.eu/public_opini
on/index_en.htm 
 
Proxy; Democracy; Political 
Participation 
Global Interity Global Interity Index http://www.globalintegrit
y.org/report 
Proxy 
Freedom 
House 
Freedom house 
corruption index 
http://www.freedomhouse
.org/ 
Perceptions of extent of petty 
corruption. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
and Wall 
Street Journal 
Index of economic 
freedom 
http://www.heritage.org/I
ndex/ 
Perceptions 
Political Risk 
Services 
Group 
International Country 
Risk Guide 
http://www.prsgroup.com/
ICRG.aspx 
Original. Corruption within 
public sector and private sector. 
Includes bribes, patronage, 
nepotism, secret party funding 
and conflict of interest 
Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 
Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance 
http://www.moibrahimfou
ndation.org/en/section/the
-ibrahim-index 
Perceptions, proxy, public 
sector corruption 
Center on 
budget and 
policy 
prioritirs 
Open budget Index http://internationalbudget.
org/what-we-do/open-
budget-survey/ 
Proxy – Availability of budget 
documents lead to greater 
oversight, transparency and 
accountability 
Source: modified and adapted from UNDP (2008), A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption 
Conceptual, methodological and empirical materials strongly support the message that no single 
corruption measure, nor single data source on corruption, is most appropriate for all purposes. 
In this paper our attention is on aggregate indicators which combine information from multiple 
sources, as is Transparency International's annual Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank's 
Worldwide Governance Indicators who capture six key dimensions of governance (Voice & 
Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and especially Control of Corruption) between 1996 and present. The two data 
sets are regarded as the most reliable for cross-national comparisons and cover a large number of 
countries. 
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is 
perceived to be. A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on 
a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a 
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country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other 
countries/territories included in the index. 
The Control of Corruption index is an aggregation of various indicators that measure the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Measurement tools that aggregate a number of existing data sources, like the CPI or WGI, have their 
strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, composite indicators can be useful in summarizing a lot of 
information from several sources, and in so doing they can limit the influence of measurement error in 
individual indicators and potentially increase the accuracy of measuring a concept as broad as 
corruption. On the other hand, one can run the risk of losing conceptual clarity (Rohwer, 2009). 
Believing that corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into 
economic relationships, the approach that we propose expresses the elementary truth that the economic 
policies oriented towards interventionism and redistribution will fail to ensure prosperity. Therefore, 
the only sustainable way to reaching this goal is to promote systematic economic freedom. 
To highlight Economic Freedom, in this paper, we will use The Index of Economic Freedom is a series 
of 10 economic measurements created by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. Its 
stated objective is to measure the degree of economic freedom in the world's nations. The main 
assumption in the index is that economic freedom is a positive cultural and societal influence. 
The Index measures the level of economic freedom in 161 countries around the world. To measure 
economic freedom, it focuses the study on 10 different factors: 
1. Business Freedom - is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a 
business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of 
government in the regulatory process; 
2. Trade Freedom - is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
affect imports and exports of goods and services; 
3. Fiscal Freedom - is a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It includes both the 
direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and the 
overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP; 
4. Government Spending - considers the level of government expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP. Government expenditures, including consumption and transfers, account for the entire 
score; 
5. Monetary Freedom - combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price 
controls. Both inflation and price controls distort market activity; 
6. Investment Freedom - in an economically free country, there would be no constraints on the 
flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would be allowed to move their resources 
into and out of specific activities both internally and across the country’s borders without 
restriction; 
7. Financial Freedom - is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence 
from government control and interference in the financial sector; 
8. Property Rights - is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state; 
9. Freedom from Corruption - is derived primarily from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI); 
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10. Labor Freedom - is a quantitative measure that looks into various aspects of the legal and 
regulatory framework of a country’s labor market. 
The Index provides a framework for understanding how open countries are to competition, the 
channals of state intervention in the economy, whether through taxation, spending or overregulation 
and, also the strength and independence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules and protect private 
property. But it is important to notice that Economic freedom is distinct from political freedom 
(participation in the political process on equal conditions, actual competition for political power, and 
free and fair elections) and from civil freedom (protection against unreasonable visitations, access to 
fair trials, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech). 
Knowing that Economic freedom is an important factor accounting for Economic growth is probable 
on purely theoretical grounds, and to measure economic performance we will use the level of GDP. 
2.2. The linkage between corruption, economic freedom and economic growth 
The linkage between corruption, economic freedom and economic growth brings to forefront the 
method of correlation, that opened new ways for quantitative social science. In our paper, the 
causality, as a simple explanatory principle, of events was broadened to include the notion of 
association between events, such: 
 The linkage between corruption and economic growth; 
 The linkage between economic growth and economic freedom; 
 The linkage between corruption and economic freedom. 
The vast body of literature considered highlights two serious problems in examining the relationship 
between corruption, economic freedom and economic growth (Swaleheen and Stansel, 2007): 
- differences among countries, known as “time invariant heterogeneity” or “country fixed 
effects”, in terms of religion or culture; 
- institutions have an important role in explaining cross-country differences in corruption 
(Triesman, 2000) and the rate of growth (Islam, 1995). 
2.2.1 The linkage between corruption and economic growth 
Empirically, there is broad consensus that corruption is detrimental to the economic performance of 
countries on the long term, in contrast with the ideas that corruption is a standard distortion, because 
corruption exhibited its harmful effects on growth. 
Ugur and Nandini (2011a, b) addressing the impact of corruption on economic growth theoretically 
and empirically, using a meta-synthesis of the empirical evidence on the direct and indirect effects of 
corruption on growth shows that the theoretical/analytical literature can be listed as follows: 
- corruption has a negative impact on economic growth; 
- the relationship between corruption and growth is not uniform between countries and over 
time;  
- corruption’s effects on growth are mediated through contextual factors such as the level of 
development, the degree of centralisation of corrupt activities and the quality of governance 
institutions;  
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- the indirect adverse effects of corruption on growth are higher than its direct effects, and the 
highest indirect effect percolates through the public finance/expenditure channel, followed by 
the human capital channel. 
Mauro (1995) in the first econometric study about impact of corruption on economic growth and 
investment across countries finds that much of the effects of corruption on growth take place 
indirectly, through the effect on investment, and when investment is controlled for, the direct effect of 
corruption on growth is weak. Although he did not find a significant relationship between corruption 
and growth, he did find a significant relationship between bureaucratic efficiency and growth (Mauro’s 
results were later confirmed by Aliyu and Elijah (2009), Méon and Sekkat (2005, 2007) and, Aidt et al. 
(2008), Haque and Kneller (2005), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), who report consistently that 
corruption is detrimental to economic growth). 
Rahman et al. (1999) examined the effects of corruption on economic growth and gross domestic 
investment for Bangladesh. This study extended the earlier studies by Baro (1991) and modifing 
Mauro’s model by including two regional dummy variables, find that corruption is significantly and 
negatively associated with cross-country differences in economic growth and gross domestic 
investment. The authors suggest that corruption retards economic growth by reducing foreign direct 
investment, so, the caution is that endogeneity must be looked at more seriously in investing the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth. 
Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) argue that the relationship between corruption and growth is non-
monotonic (quadratic) and that this relationship depends on the degree of political freedom, because 
corruption has a beneficial impact on long-run growth at low levels of incidence but is harmful at high 
levels and that there therefore may exist a growth maximizing level of corruption 
2.2.2 The linkage between economic growth and economic freedom 
The main conclusion of the studies was that more economic freedom fosters economic growth, so, 
there exists a positive impact of various measures of economic freedom on the rate of economic 
growth: 
- Dawson (2003), De Haan and Sturm (2000, 2001), Adkins et al. (2002), Pitlik (2002), Weede 
and Kampf (2002), using as dependent variable the growth and as independent variable the 
change in economic freedom index obtained as result an effect significant positive; 
- Ayal and Karras (1998), Goldsmith (1995), Dawson (2003), Hanson (2000), Ali and Crain 
(2002), Carlsson and Lundstrom (2001), Pitlik (2002), Weede and Kampf (2002), Mahmood et 
al. (2010) using as dependent variable the growth and as independent variable the level of 
economic freedom index obtained as result an effect significant positive; 
- Hanke and Walters (1997), Leschke (2000), using as dependent variable the GDP per capita 
and as independent variable the level of economic freedom index obtained as result an effect 
significant positive; 
- Gwartney et al. (2006, 2011), De Haan and Sturm (2000), Heckelman and Stroup (2002), 
Adkins et al. (2002), using as dependent variable the GDP per capita and as independent 
variable the level of economic freedom index obtained as result an effect not significant; 
- Cebula (2011) investigates the impact of the ten forms of economic freedom on economic 
growth in OECD nations, using both, panel least squares estimations and panel two-stage least 
squares estimations find that the natural log of purchasing-power- parity adjusted per capita 
real GDP in OECD nations was positively impacted by monetary freedom, business freedom, 
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investment freedom, labor freedom, fiscal freedom, property rights freedom, and freedom 
from corruption. 
A number of other studies attempting to clear the relationship between economic growth and economic 
freedom, answering the question whether freedom causes growth, growth causes freedom, or the two 
are jointly bilateral: 
- The empirical result of Farr et al. (1998), in one of the earliest studies on causality between 
economic freedom and the level of GDP was the existence of feedback between economic 
freedom and the level of GDP; 
- Then, Heckelman (2000) in an attempt to perform the causal relationship with economic 
growth, suggested the average level of economic freedom precedes economic growth.  
- De Haan and Sturm (2000) also pointed out that economic freedom brought countries to their 
steady state level of economic growth more quickly, but did not increase the rate of steady 
state growth. 
- Vega-Gordillo and Álvarez-Arce (2003) yielded interesting results that economic freedoms 
appeared to enhance economic growth. 
- Dawson (2003) shows that economic freedom is the result of growth rather than a cause of 
growth. 
2.2.3 The linkage between corruption and economic freedom 
To better understand the link between corruption and economic freedom, most of the studies examine 
this relationship both in the form of informal economic activity and in the public-sector bureaucracy: 
- Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) find that in “free” countries, corruption and growth are 
inversely and nonlinearly related. In countries that are “not free,” the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth is not statistically significant.  
- Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) argue that economic factors are often considered to be the 
prime causes of corruption. For instance, wealthy people have greater motivation and more 
opportunity to exhibit corrupt practices, whereas poor people are more vulnerable to being 
exploited and are less able to hold wealthy people accountable for their decisions and actions. 
- Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) report that, depending on whether a country is rich or poor, 
different types of improvements in economic freedom have differential effects on corruption. 
They indicate that the legal structure affects corruption more in rich countries, whereas access 
to sound money is significant for poor countries. 
- Billger and Goel (2009) show that, among the most corrupt nations, greater economic freedom 
does not appear to cut corruption 
There is a relatively widespread literature which, by applying the econometric methods developed 
mainly in growth econometrics, examines the relationship between corruption, economic freedom and 
economic growth, but, in these empirical studies, many difficulties lies in obtaining proper measures 
of corruption, that identify and describe its linkage with the components of economic freedom and 
economic growth. 
3. Methodology and Model 
First, the empirical approach in this paper, in order to highlight the linkage between corruption and 
economic growth will monitor the “good governance” defined by the six dimensions, namely, Voice 
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and Responsibility, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, and its incidence on the economic growth in 
the European Union. 
The general econometric specification is formulized as follows: 
 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜓𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜖 (1) 
In this linear model, left-hand-side variable is economic activity as represented by GDP growth and 
denoted by gdp. It is employed in order to measure the influence of governmental activities on 
economic growth and development. On the other hand, there exist six independent right-hand-side 
variables describing the dimensions of “good governance”. Besides, model also includes a constant 
and a dummy variable which represents 2008 financial crisis. If the influence of crisis is progressing in 
questioned period for related country, it takes the value of 1; otherwise 0. 
Data used in the paper, for EU 27, gathered from World Bank governance indicators called the KK 
Datasets, who is a set of world wide measures of six composite dimensions of governance perception 
indicators for 105 countries. These indicators are oriented so that higher value correspond to better 
outcomes, on a scale refers to the point estimates range from -2.5 to 2.5. These estimates are also 
rescaled and ranked in percentile (0-100). The lower percentile is ranked as worse off governance 
indicators whereas upper percentile is ranked as best governance for any given country. Thus, 
governance appears as a positive multidimensional concept concerning diverse essential aspects of 
institutional structures which, when associated, singularize every nation. 
In the paper, linear panel data estimation methods were utilized in order to estimate the equation 
above. It is necessary to test the stability of series before the identification of the relationship between 
variables. Regression analysis would not be consistent and spurious regression problem would occur if 
unstationary data are used. In this regard, Levin, Lin Chu (LLC) (2002) and Im, Peseran and Shin 
(IPS) (2003) unit root tests were used for stationary investigation.  
When empirical literature is reviewed, it is seen that the ordinary least squares (OLS), the fixed-effects 
model (FEM), or the random-effects model (REM) are employed for linear panel data estimations. 
After being proved the stationariy of the variables, developed model i.e., (1) was estimated by linear 
panel data estimation method. Estimation results are reported in table 2. Hausman test confirms that 
there is no correlation between individual random effects and explanatory variables, indicating that the 
REM is consistent and efficient. LM test statistics also confirm our model selection and refer to the 
one-way REM that includes only individual effects. Diagnostic tests show that developed model 
contain both group and time effects and there exists no multicollinearity, no heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 2: Panel Data Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: GDP 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat.  
constant 4,777 2,069 2,39[0.01]
**
  
voice -5,881 2,421 -2,42[0.01]
 **
  
pol -0,576 1,362 -0,42[0.67]  
gov 5,965 1,283 4,64[0.00]
***
  
regu 0,184 1,470 0,12[0.90]  
law -1,714 1,629 -1,05[0.29]  
cor -0,279 1,125 -0,24[0.80]  
dummy -8,306 1,016 -8,16[0.00]
***
  
R
2
=0,47 LMtime=0,39[0.71]  VIF=1,754[0.58] 
Adj. R
2
=0,42 LMgroup= 360,80[0.00]
***
 Wooldridge=0,285[0.23] 
F Stat.=9,98[0.00]
***
 Hausman=0,00[1.00] LMh=11,025[0.56] 
Source: authors’ own construction 
Note: Probability values of t-statistics are in brackets. 
***, ** and denote significant at%1, %5 respectively. 
According to table, government effectiveness and regularity quality effect GDP positively while voice 
& accountability, political stability & no violence/terrorism, rule of law and control of corruption 
negatively. Nonetheless, only voice & accountability and government effectiveness are statistically 
significant. That is, a rising score in voice & accountability decreases economic activity and a rising 
score of effectiveness of the EU governance increases economic activity raises in European Union. In 
addition, reported in table 2, dummy variable showing the effect of the 2008 crisis is highly significant 
and points out that financial crisis influences the growth rates of EU countries in a negative way. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, it is aimed to investigate the empirical linkage between political corruption, economic 
freedom and economic growth, but this proposed approach is highly applied due by the complexity of 
concepts addressed. We find ourselves in a position to analyzed and synthesized only a part of our 
initial approach, the linkage between corruption and economic growth, but hoping that our purpose 
will continue in a future paper. 
The results recorded in this paper are closely correlated with the EU reality, and this negative impact 
of voice and accountability indicator on growth is worrying, because voice and accountability matter 
for development for two sets of reasons. First, powerlessness, voicelessness and a lack of 
accountability are constitutive of poverty, as such, enhancing voice and accountability leads in itself to 
a reduction in poverty. Second, voice and accountability can lead to other outcomes such as greater 
ownership and pro-poor policies which can lead to a reduction in poverty. It should expect a stronger 
correlation between these two variables if good governance is the result of a long historical 
accumulation of individuals with good morality (as argued by culturalists) or of feedback effects and 
increasing returns between social trust and good. 
On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between the other four dimensions and Union’s 
economic growth. There are two major factors behind this situation. First one is about sample period 
which covers 1996-2010. While EU had 15 members referring to EU15 in 1996, in 2004 it contained 
25 and finally in 2007 the number reached 27. Hence, it is reasonable that evaluating EU’s structure 
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which formed different time periods might lead a mistake. Second, member countries have 
heterogeneous political and economic structure which differs from each other. So that, it could be 
natural to find an insignificant relationship in questioned variables in this kind of structure. In 
addition, the latest financial crisis that is still effecting member economies has a strong adverse 
influence on the growth rates of the Union in an expected way. 
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